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MEHNAT IQTISODIYOTI VA INSON KAPITALI

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GENDER INEQUALITY IN LABOUR MARKET

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Abstract. The labor market is used as the primary example in this study to examine the effects of the unequal division of domestic labor on men’s and women’s motivations for involvement and effort in competitive relationships. We discovered that prejudice in favor of women at moderate levels encourages men and women to work more and increase women’s engagement. It cannot, however, ensure that men and women put in an equal amount of effort and full participation without causing economic inefficiency or even distorting the labor market. Given these restrictions, we examine the outcomes of a different approach to policy that encourages males to participate in household duties. The major takeaway is that we must first address the household issue if we want men and women to have equal opportunities in the job market. Despite having a bigger proportion of the domestic workforce, women are less competitive than males. We anticipate that the information we have gathered will help decision-makers and scholars create legislation that will give men and women the same opportunities in the job market.

Keywords. Gender equality, Affirmative action, Cost reduction policies, Efficiency, Women participation.

Introduction:

Due to women’s growing market engagement, the traditional family structure of a breadwinner and a housewife has been replaced by a dual-earner model. Because the traditional gender construction of male breadwinner and female homemaker roles persists at home, women’s housework burden has not decreased proportionally to their increase in market labor (Bianchi 2000), despite the fact that men are doing more housework than ever before. According to Gornick and Meyers (2003), these imbalanced developments are accompanied by a social paradox: if everyone is working, who will look after the kids?

Children serve as a metaphor for a domestic issue that affects practically every aspect of the family unit. For instance, according to Presser (1994) and Bianchi et al. (2000), women perform 65–80% of all household work, such as cooking, grocery shopping, child care, and cleaning. For a survey, see Shelton and John (1996). The overwhelming nature of the situation makes it difficult for women to compete on an equal footing with men.

Despite the significant advancements made over the past few decades, particularly with regard to women’s participation in the labor market, gender policy is still unable to give women the same possibilities as men (Blau and Kahn 2016). In contrast to measures encouraging market engagement, policies encouraging men’s participation in household duties have made only little progress (Pascall and Lewis 2004).

This research aims to study the effects of asymmetrical home labor distribution on men and women’s involvement and incentive structures for effort in competitive settings.1 We contrast the outcomes of cost-cutting measures versus affirmative action. The latter gender strategy, which is suggested in this essay, aims to encourage an equitable distribution of family duties and decrease the amount of domestic work performed by women, which has the positive feedback effect of lowering labor market effort costs. We also offer suggestions on how to lessen the ongoing gender imbalance.

Affirmative action works directly in the job market to provide the prospect of gender equality. Cost-cutting measures, on the other hand, tackle non-market disparity while maintaining the same gender equality objective (Pascall and Lewis 2004). While cost-cutting measures eliminate the household bias against women, affirmative action introduces a bias in favor of women in the work market. The latter policy encourages an equitable allocation of household labor, which calls for a shift in society’s long-standing gender stereotypes that assign males as breadwinners and females as homemakers.

We track the labor market participation of men and women for each of these two policies since it is a crucial metric for gauging gender equality and a key topic of conversation.3 We measure the overall labor market effort and competition intensity of men and women in order to comprehend the implications in terms of economic efficiency. This is a significant indicator because, despite the widespread support that affirmative action has received, some authors have questioned its effectiveness in achieving the best economic outcomes because the "best" candidate is not always the one who is selected (Coate and Loury 1993; Holzer and Neumark 2000, 2006; among others). According to Holzer and Neumark (2000), affirmative action raises questions about social welfare and economic efficiency. Affirmative action can also be seen by some as a form of reverse discrimination that feeds preconceptions and undermines the meritocratic principle.

We explore a hypothetical scenario where men and women with uneven household labor duties compete for a market prize (such as a career, promotion, pay, power, etc.) on the job market. The current research is the first theoretical method in this setting that connects an individual's share of domestic labor with their ability to compete on the job market.

Literature Review:

Women exhibit a lesser willingness to compete than men, according to the growing body of research on gender differences in competitiveness (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). Women typically do worse than males in competitive contexts, in addition to gender disparities in competitiveness (Dohmen and Falk 2011; Gneezy and Rustichini 2004; Gneezy et al. 2003; Vandegrift and Yavas 2009). This literature is reviewed by Croson and Gneezy (2009) and Niederle and Vesterlund (2011). Men prefer competing with women over women do (Booth and Nolen 2012; Datta Gupta et al. 2013; Ivanova-Stenzel and Kübler 2011), therefore this is another factor. The reason why women perform less than males and avoid competition becomes a question.

According to Gneezy et al. (2009), culture is where the issue began. They demonstrate that Tanzanian women from patriarchal civilizations are not as competitive as women from matriarchal societies in India. However, other important determinants include genetics (Bateup et al. 2002), discrimination (Altonji and Blank 1999; Goldin and Rouse 2000), preferences (Croson and Gneezy 2009), risk aversion (Vandegrift and Brown 2005), and strategic behavior (Cubel and Sánchez-Pagés 2017). The competitive disparity between men and women vanishes in elderly populations, claim Flory et al. (2018).

Affirmative action through quotas, according to Niederle et al. (2013), encourages reluctant (but qualified) women to participate and compete. According to their findings [Holzer and Neumark (2000, 2006) reviewed the literature], this kind of policy should be used. However, as stated in the introduction, there are concerns over the sufficiency of affirmative action in terms of economic efficiency and incentives (Altonji and Blank 1999; Coate and Loury 1993; Holzer and Neumark 2000). According to Coate and Loury (1993), affirmative action may lessen discrimination in this situation, but it may also amplify stereotypes.

The unequal home labor division is explained by two primary theoretical frameworks (Benschop et al. 2001; Bianchi et al. 2000). The first is based on economic and specialization principles (Becker 1985); the household member who contributes the most resources has more power and can choose to enter the labor market (Lundberg and Pollak 1996), which will result in them doing less housework (Greenstein 2000). The second strategy is predicated on the notion that gender is a socially constructed concept that has been institutionalized and is constantly being remade through cyclical rituals (Lorber 1994). It focuses on how beliefs about who should carry out what tasks affect how domestic and market labor are distributed throughout the household (Davis and Greenstein 2009). Some people think that some professions, such as nursing, social work, librarianship, and elementary school teaching, are more suited for women than for men. According to Lorber (1994), this is because these occupations give women more freedom to have children and care for them.

A theoretical model of market and domestic production in households where the marginal cost of labor rises with home hours is created by Albanesi and Olivetti (2009). As a result, it is more challenging for businesses to reward employees who put in long hours at home, and they will favor those who put in little effort. Firms think that the intra-household allocation of home hours benefits men over women in the self-fulfilling "gendered" equilibrium, which will in turn decide the intra-household efficient allocation of home hours in favor of males in a perpetual and cyclical manner.

The difficulty of establishing equal sharing when there are established gender roles is highlighted in the theoretical literature on non-cooperative models of home labor division (Vierling-Claassen 2013; Youm and Laumann 2003). In the current work, we explore the implications of changing the family labor distribution in terms of participation and effort.

Methodology:

Men M and women W are paired up in an economy where they compete against one another for a market prize (i.e., we investigate the scenarios where men compete with men, women compete with women, and males compete with men). Market value is earned through active work and labor market involvement. As an alternative, people might choose the benefit of avoiding the labor market, which is an outside option. We go into further depth about our model in the sentences that follow.

Let the subscript $g(i)g(i)$ represent the person ii of gender group $g \in \{M, W\}g \in \{M, W\}$. Let $g(i) = m(i) \in Mg(i) = m(i) \in M$ and $g(i) = w(i) \in Wg(i) = w(i) \in W$ represent the situations in which person ii belongs to the male and the female's group, respectively, and the person ii identity is relevant, and let $g(i) = mg(i) = m$ and $g(i) = wg(i) = w$ denote the cases in which is relevant the difference between gender groups, but not the identity of the person ii.

There is a continuum of people, indexed by $i \in (0,1)i \in (0,1)$, within each gender group who differ in terms of the overall cost of the domestic work $h_{g(i)} \in (0, \bar{h})h_{g(i)} \in (0, \bar{h})$, where $\bar{h}$ $\bar{h}$ marks the upper bound on the cost of the domestic labor. The cost of domestic labor is distributed according to some distribution function, which we assume to be uniform, namely $h_{g(i)} \sim U(0, \bar{h})$ $h_{g(i)} \sim U(0, \bar{h})$ where $\bar{h} = v/2\bar{h} = v/2$ for all $g(i) \in \{M, W\}g(i) \in \{M, W\}$.. The uniform distribution is the most logical and impartial assumption in our situation, especially if we lack a theory to support any other distribution. The upper constraint on the cost of domestic labor, $\bar{h} = v/2$ $\bar{h} = v/2$, is selected to be neither too high—where no one would have any incentives to participate—nor too low—where everyone would be assured to participate.

Since there is a distinct man and distinct woman for each level of the cost of the domestic labor $h_{g(i)}h_{g(i)}$, each level of the cost of the domestic labor reflects a distinct household made up of a man and a woman.

Men and women contribute different amounts to the cost of household work, which is represented by the symbol $s_{g(i)} \in (0,1)s_{g(i)} \in (0,1)$.. In our situation, all members of the same gender group, $s_m = 1 - ss_m = 1 - s$ and $s_w = s \in [1/2,1)s_w = s \in [1/2,1)$, share the same portion of the cost of domestic work. for every $m(i) \in Mm(i) \in M$ and $w(i) \in Ww(i) \in W$ M. Keep in mind that women pay a higher (or equal) percentage of the cost of domestic labor than males, i.e., $s \geq 1 - s.s \geq 1 - s.$. This circumstance is consistent with the present paradigm where women are expected to contribute more to domestic duties than males. The research of affirmative action and cost-cutting measures, as well as the current paper, are motivated by this unequal distribution of family labor.

Additionally, people must decide how much effort to put into the labor market. In this situation, people choose whether or not to take the zero-normalized outside option $x_{g(i)} = 0x_{g(i)} = 0$ for all $g(i) \in \{M, W\}g(i) \in \{M, W\}$, or to enter the labor market and compete for the reward

$v_{g(i)} = v > 0 v_{g(i)} = v > 0$ for all $g(i) \in \{M, W\} g(i) \in \{M, W\}$.. The reward from domestic activities (such as shopping, pregnancy and child raising, etc.) is likewise the zeronormalized outside option. It should be noted that while the cost of family labor is individual, or $s_g h_{g(i)} s_g h_{g(i)}$,the gains from household output accrue to both men and women equally.

The labor market reward is earned by actively participating in the labor market, which requires expensive effort $e_{g(i)|k(j)} > 0 e_{g(i)|k(j)} > 0$, where the subscript $g(i) \mid k(j) g(i) \mid k(j)$ indicates the dependence on the gender match $g(i), k(j) \in \{M, W\} g(i), k(j) \in \{M, W\}$. The labor market's marginal cost of effort, $c_{g(i)} > 0 c_{g(i)} > 0$, is the same for everyone in the same gender group, so that $c_{m(i)} = c_m > 0 c_{m(i)} = c_m > 0$ and $c_{w(i)} = c_w > 0 c_{w(i)} = c_w > 0$. As a result, subject to the gender match, the individual $g(i) \in \{M, W\} g(i) \in \{M, W\}$'s total cost of effort is:

$tc_{g(i)|k(j)} = c_g e_{g(i)|k(j)} + s_g h_{g(i)}, tc_{g(i)|k(j)} = c_g e_{g(i)|k(j)} + s_g h_{g(i)},$
which is the total of the domestic cost and labor market components.

Assuming that $c_m = f_m(s)\, c_m = f_m(s)$ and $c_w = f_w(s) c_w = f_w(s)$, and that $\partial f_m(s) / \partial s < 0 \partial f_m(s) / \partial s < 0$ and $\partial f_w(s) / \partial s > 0 \partial f_w(s) / \partial s > 0$ are true, we may say that the labor market cost of effort is a function of the domestic labor's part in the cost. These characteristics imply that the labor market cost of effort decreases as the individual portion of the household effort cost decreases. It makes sense that the lower the individual's share of the household effort cost, the more time the person has to succeed and concentrate in the labor market, as well as the more time they have to spend on leisure activities, self-education, information acquisition, and other activities that later on become essential for success in the labor market. The simplest expression of these qualities in our case is $c_m = c(1 - s) c_m = c(1 - s)$ and $c_w = cs. c_w = cs.$ This supposition connects domestic affairs to the labor market and gives effort a qualitative element. In Albanesi and Olivetti's (2009) theoretical model of market and home production within households, where the marginal cost of effort is rising as home hours increase, a similar premise is made.Their presumption is justified by the idea that when people perform many tasks, the marginal cost of each task rises, which is consistent with our claim.

The level of effort put out by the participants in the labor market, or $e_{g(i)|k(j)} e_{g(i)|k(j)}$, determines the outcome of the competition. Following Franke (2012), we assume that the Tullock (1980) type contest success function captures the competitive process in this case. When competing against the person $k(j) \in \{M, W\} k(j) \in \{M, W\}$, the individual $g(i) \in \{M, W\} g(i) \in \{M, W\}$ has the following winning probability:

$$p_{g(i)|k(j)} = a_{g(i)} e_{g(i)|k(j)}^{r_{g(i)}} / \left(a_{g(i)} e_{g(i)|k(j)}^{r_{g(i)}} + a_{k(j)} e_{k(j)|g(i)}^{r_{k(j)}} \right)$$

$$p_{g(i)|k(j)} = a_{g(i)} e_{g(i)|k(j)}^{r_{g(i)}} / \left(a_{g(i)} e_{g(i)|k(j)}^{r_{g(i)}} + a_{k(j)} e_{k(j)|g(i)}^{r_{k(j)}} \right) \quad (1)$$

for all $g(i), k(j) \in \{M, W\} g(i), k(j) \in \{M, W\}$.

The $r_{g(i)} > 0 r_{g(i)} > 0$ parameter calculates the effectiveness of the individual i attempt. For the sake of simplicity, we take into account the accepted theory in the contest literature, which states that $r_{g(i)} = 1 r_{g(i)} = 1$ for all $g(i) \in \{M, W\} g(i) \in \{M, W\}$. The bias is introduced by

using the parameter $a_{g(i)} > 0 a_{g(i)} > 0$. Setting $a_{m(i)} = 1 a_{m(i)} = 1$ and $a_{w(i)} = a \geq 1$ $a_{w(i)} = a \geq 1$ for all $m(i) \in Mm(i) \in M$ and $w(i) \in Ww(i) \in W$ results in the gender affirmative action bias. The bias caused by the affirmative action policy is contained in a single parameter $(a \geq 1)(a \geq 1)$, making this assumption analytically convenient.

Consequently, each person's $g(i) \in \{M, W\} g(i) \in \{M, W\}$ purpose is to maximize the utility function:

$$u_{g(i)|k(j)} = p_{g(i)|k(j)} v - \left(c_g e_{g(i)|k(j)} + s_g h_{g(i)}\right)$$
$$u_{g(i)|k(j)} = p_{g(i)|k(j)} v - \left(c_g e_{g(i)|k(j)} + s_g h_{g(i)}\right) \quad (2)$$

where $p_{g(i)|k(j)} p_{g(i)|k(j)}$ is given by (1).

Every person determines whether or not to enter the labor market after selecting the labor market effort that maximizes the utility in statement (2). In this situation, if the labor market utility is greater than the value obtained from the outside option, the participation constraint $u_{g(i)|k(j)} \geq x_{g(i)} = u_{g(i)|k(j)} \geq x_{g(i)} = 0$ is met, and the individual participates.

Results And Discussions:

Definition 1 (gender equality) The definition of gender equality is $E(u_{w|m}) = E(u_{m|w})$ $E(u_{w|m}) = E(u_{m|w})$.

We take into account the expected utilities because the household effort cost (and hence the market outcome) are ex-ante unpredictable. These anticipated utilities compile data on consumer and economic activity.

According to Holzer and Neumark (2000, 2006), affirmative action relates to the economic condition of women and minorities in terms of employment, education, ownership, and success.

By benefiting the members of the disadvantaged group, these policies have a direct impact on market relations. The idea is vaguely defined. Affirmative action, on the other hand, is unmistakably seen as an effort to promote equity and fairness between these two categories of people. The following definition can be applied to our situation.

Definition 2 (affirmative action) Affirmative action is a term used to describe policies that slant the labor market in favor of women (in our context, this means increasing the value of a>1) in an effort to advance gender equality.

Affirmative action policies are insufficient, according to certain authors. For instance, Gornick and Meyers (2003) and Pascall and Lewis (2004) both advocate for the promotion of egalitarian home policies that can alter how men and women are treated unequally and how gender is perceived. According to Davis and Greenstein (2009) and Lorber (1994), dichotomous hierarchies that appear in many aspects of daily life are the main cause of inequality. These hierarchies are based on inequalities in socially imposed gender roles.

According to Bielby and Bielby (1989), women continue to bear an unfair share of the burden of family work but are unable to forge meaningful professional identities.

Definition 3 (cost reduction policies) Cost-cutting measures are acts that lessen the proportion of home work performed by women (or, in our case, a reduction in $s \in [1/2,1)) s \in [1/2,1))$ with the aim of advancing gender equality.

The cost of domestic labor that we are taking into account is the portion of domestic labor that the household either cannot afford or must outsource to other parties but which nonetheless benefits both household members. The cost of domestic work is determined by factors like household income, free time, gender roles, and household hierarchy.

Cost-cutting measures eliminate the prejudice against women that currently exists in the household, whereas affirmative action puts a bias in favor of women into the job market competition. A strong and significant sense of fairness and justice in society is further promoted through cost reduction initiatives as opposed to affirmative action and other policies.

The impact of cost-cutting and affirmative action policies on the incentives for men and women to participate in competitive relationships are summarized in the results that follow.

When men and women are in competition:

1. With affirmative action and cost-cutting measures, the participation of males declines for:

$$a > \phi_m^\alpha \equiv \frac{s}{1-s}\left((2/(1-s))^{1/2} - 1\right),$$

Otherwise, guys can participate fully.

1. Affirmative action and cost-cutting measures promote the participation of women for:

$$1 \le a < \phi_w^\alpha \equiv \frac{s}{1-s}\frac{1}{(2/s)^{1/2} - 1},$$

Otherwise, women can participate fully.

2. With affirmative action and cost-cutting measures, total participation rises for $1 \le a < \phi_w^\alpha$

$1 \le a < \phi_w^\alpha$; total participation is full for:

$\phi_w^\alpha \le a \le \phi_m^\alpha$

Otherwise, fewer people participate overall.

Conclusion:

This study demonstrates how men's higher labor market participation and competitive capacity (as compared to women) might be attributed to their smaller portion of the home labor cost.

Affirmative action is only partially effective in this situation. Affirmative action would also be unnecessary if the cost of domestic work was split equally between men and women. Real gender equality is not feasible, even though this issue has not been resolved. The domestic environment has an impact on both men and women's conduct, which in turn affects their ability to compete.

All people favor household action policies because they foster a sense of justice and fairness in society. However, when it comes to implementation, they could run across social and cultural obstacles. These hurdles exist even in nations that strive for gender equality.

Affirmative action, on the other hand, has the advantage of being easier to adopt, execute, and measure but is less capable of achieving full gender equality. However, we discovered that modest levels of affirmative action are very effective at encouraging participation and effectiveness. Additionally, we discovered that cost-cutting and affirmative action measures typically don't work well together. The more equality there is between men and women in the home, the less valid and successful affirmative action measures become.

All other aspects of actual gender equality will converge once household equality is attained. The truth is nuanced. In order to be able to concentrate just on the qualitative aspects of the affirmative and cost-cutting strategies without taking into account any other factors that can potentially bloat the analysis, we have adopted a number of simplifying assumptions. For instance, we have disregarded potential for specialization within the home or the biological distinctions between males and women (Becker 1985). The assumptions with regard to the theoretical model are intended to keep the model analytically tractable. It is possible to conduct additional research on the subject of these and other issues.

Finally, the disparity between men and women's attitudes about the labor market poses a number of research problems that must be adequately answered. We discovered a weak treatment in terms of theoretical models that take into account rational individuals with strategic incentives, despite the fact that the literature on the division of domestic labor appears to be well established and developed. In our opinion, more investigation into this lead is warranted. This is a particularly important point because empirical research yields contradictory conclusions. Theory might aid in the improvement of findings. A research agenda on these topics is something we demand. Despite the difficulty of the subject, this

work is a step in the right direction. We anticipate that the results of our research will contribute to a deeper understanding of the explanations for why men and women appear to behave differently on the job market. Our findings could particularly help researchers and policymakers create effective programs that would give women and men the same opportunity.

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